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Abstract: This paper modifies the optimal punishment analysis by incorporating investment 
incentives with external benefits.  In the models examined, the recommendation that the optimal 
penalty should internalize the marginal social harm is no longer valid.  We focus on antitrust 
applications.  In light of the benefits from innovation, the optimal policy will punish 
monopolizing firms more leniently than suggested in the standard static model.  It may be 
optimal not to punish the monopolizing firm at all, or to reward the firm rather than punish it.  
We examine the precise balance between penalty and reward in the optimal punishment scheme. 
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I. Introduction 
The literature on the economic theory of punishment consists mostly of models in which 
offenders are held strictly liable and sanctioned with case-specific optimal penalties.  The law, in 
contrast, applies case-specific cost-benefit tests to determine liability and uses standardized 
penalties.1 
 In spite of this difference between the theory of punishment and the practice in courts, the 
theory remains useful as a guide for policy.  This paper follows tradition by examining optimal 
penalties as a source of guidelines for legal policy.  The focus here is innovation and punishment, 
especially in the context of antitrust. 
 The prevailing analysis of optimal antitrust penalties holds that in order to avoid 
inefficient overdeterrence, the optimal penalty should internalize the social losses generated by 
potentially anticompetitive conduct (Becker, 1968).  If enforcement is perfect and costless, such 
a penalty would internalize the transfer from consumers and the deadweight loss (Landes, 1983).  
Thus, if a monopolizing firm introduces efficiencies, it might still have an incentive to carry out 
its monopolizing conduct, as long as the efficiency gain exceeds the deadweight loss. 
 But this analysis does not incorporate plausible social benefits from monopolization.  The 
prevailing analysis is based on a static model in which the gains from monopolization accrue to 
the firm and the losses are suffered by society.  In contrast, a dynamic perspective2 would take 
into account the social gains from investments made by the firm in its quest to become a 
                                                 
1 For example, in American antitrust law, the main application for this paper’s model, courts use rule of reason 
analysis to exempt efficient conduct for the most part, while applying statutorily-set penalties or treble damages to 
the violations.  In tort law, courts use the negligence test, or the risk-utility test in products liability cases, to 
determine liability.  Each of these legal tests is a type of cost-benefit test. 
2 On the difference between static and dynamic punishment models, see Leung (1991).  Our framework is simpler 
than Leung’s.  We use the term dynamic here in the sense common in the antitrust literature to refer to an analysis 
that takes the investment effects of enforcement into account, see Sidak and Teece (2010). 
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monopoly.  Investments in market-creating or market-expanding innovation should be 
incorporated into the analysis of punishment. 
 We modify the optimal punishment analysis by incorporating investment that has 
external benefits – such as the creation of surplus for consumers.  In the models examined here, 
the recommendation that the optimal antitrust penalty should internalize the marginal social harm 
– as measured by the sum of the consumer surplus transfer, the deadweight loss, and the cost of 
enforcement – is no longer valid.  We explore the recommendations from two simple versions of 
the dynamic story, one in which the offender invests in market-expanding innovation before 
committing the offense (monopolization), and another in which the victim invests before 
suffering an offense. 
In the offender-investment model, which is the core of this paper, the optimal penalty for 
monopolization is a function of the consumer harm, the residual consumer surplus (after 
monopolization), the cost of enforcement, and the relative responsiveness of innovation and 
monopolization to changes in the penalty.  Specifically, the optimal penalty is a weighted 
average of the static penalty (internalizing consumer harm and enforcement cost) and an 
innovation subsidy (internalizing consumer benefit and enforcement cost), with the weights 
determined by the relative sensitivities of investment and monopolization to punishment.  This 
has implications for law and punishment policy. 
 The most obvious implication is that in light of the benefits from innovation, the optimal 
policy will punish monopolizing firms more leniently than suggested by the static model.  It may 
be optimal not to punish the firm at all, or to reward the firm rather than punish it.  In this sense, 
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the model provides a Schumpeterian perspective on punishment,3 as well as the groundwork for 
a positive theory of monopolization law, which has been puzzlingly lenient over its history.4 
 In addition, comparative statics results for the optimal penalty differ from the static 
analysis. The optimal penalty does not increase monotonically with consumer harm, and a fall in 
the probability of apprehension does not necessarily imply an increase in the optimal penalty.  A 
combination of a high fine and a low probability of punishment may not be optimal. 
 The connection between innovation and punishment is a concern in both antitrust and 
products liability.  In U.S. v. Microsoft,5 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals refused to apply a per 
se liability rule to the firm’s technological integration of the internet browser and operating 
systems because of its fear that such a rule would discourage innovation.6  In Trinko v. Verizon,7 
the Supreme Court cited the negative innovation effect as a basis for refusing to adopt the 
essential facilities theory of monopolization.8  Products liability lawsuits against drug 
manufacturers have been met with the criticism that their success will deter the development and 
marketing of new drugs.9  The unexplored issue in these cases is the precise relationship between 
the deterrence of offensive conduct and the encouragement of innovation in an optimal 
punishment scheme.10 
                                                 
3 Schumpeter (1943) (Chapters 7 and 8) famously criticized the static model of competition for ignoring the social 
benefits of innovation, and the need for firms to gain monopoly power in order to earn a positive return on 
innovation.  For a review, see Mason (1951). 
4 On the perceived leniency of monopolization law and its explanation, see Evans and Hylton (2008). 
5 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
6 Id. at 89-90.  In addition, much of the commentary about Microsoft focuses on the implications of antitrust 
enforcement for innovation in the technology industries, see Evans and Schmalensee (2002). 
7 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
8 Id. at 407. 
9 See, e.g., Steven Shavell and A. Mitchell Polinsky, Op-Ed, Vioxx Verdict’s Dark Side, Boston Globe, Aug. 23, 
2005, at A15, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/08/23/vioxx_verdicts_dark_side/.   
10 One question generated by this model is whether the optimal penalty results derived here could be implemented.  
There are two ways to approach implementation.  First, the variables that the optimal penalty incorporates indicate 
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 Parts II.A and II.B set up the static model, which replicates the standard optimal penalty 
recommendation.  Parts II.C.2 and II.C.3 explore punishment in a setting in which the offender 
makes an investment that provides social benefits, the returns to which are a function of an 
offense that he may commit in the future as well as the punishment for that offense.  Part II.C.4 
examines an extension in which the victims make investments, the expected returns to which are 
reduced by an offense that may be committed by the offender.  Part III discusses implications for 
the law. 
 
II. Model 
A. Basic Assumptions 
 All actors are risk neutral and victims are the only parties who suffer loss.  The state 
apprehends an offender after an injury has occurred.  The state does not attempt to apprehend the 
offender in each instance of an offense, and therefore the probability of apprehension 
(equivalently, detection) given an injury is less than one.  
 Let z = probability of apprehension, 0 < z' < z  1;11 c = the cost to the state of 
apprehending the offender, c > 0; v = the loss suffered by a victim, v > 0; F = fine imposed on 
apprehended offender.  M = the gross gain to the offender from committing an offense, and is 
governed by the probability distribution function H with corresponding density function h, where 
h(M) > 0 for 0 ≤ M  Mu, and h(M) = 0 otherwise. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the matters that courts should take into account in the relevant law on liability.  Second, the optimal penalty could be 
estimated by acquiring information on the probability of detection (or apprehension), the harm to victims, the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow, and the residual consumer surplus.  Although courts do not attempt to 
estimate optimal case-specific penalties, a move to such a regime, as originally advocated in Becker (1968), would 
not be infeasible. 
11 We assume a lower bound z' on the probability of apprehension because no state ever chooses to go without any 
law enforcement at all.  The minimal “night watchman” state envisioned by philosophers limits itself to enforcing 
criminal prohibitions and (maybe) contracts.  The minimal apprehension probability is the level consistent with the 
minimum expenditure necessary (staffing, equipment) to enforce criminal prohibitions. 
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 The offender cannot satisfy his preferences through the market; thus in order to enjoy the 
gain M he must commit an offense.  Because the offender will commit the offense when M > zF, 
the probability of an offense is 1–H(zF).  If Mu  zF no crimes will be committed, so that F = 
Mu/z is the minimum level of the fine that achieves complete deterrence. 
   The time line of events is as follows: the offense occurs (probability 1–H(zF)) causing 
a loss of v; enforcement occurs with probability z; the offender is apprehended at cost c, and then 
punished with a fine F.12 
 
B. Optimal Punishment Policy: Static Case 
 
 The optimal punishment policy is the combination of the fine and the probability of 
apprehension that minimizes the cost of offenses and the cost of avoiding offenses:13 
 C = (1–H(zF))(v + zc) + H(zF)E[M |M < zF] . (1) 
The optimal policy can be stated as follows. 
 Proposition 1: If Mu > v + z'c, then the optimal punishment policy is to set the fine so 
that it satisfies F = F* = v/z' + c, and the probability of apprehension at the minimum level z' 
(internalization rule).  If Mu  v + z'c, then the optimal policy is to set the fine and probability of 
apprehension so that zF  Mu (complete deterrence rule). 
                                                 
12 Once apprehended, punishment occurs with certainty, given the assumption of strict liability.  In a later part, we 
consider a “rule of reason” standard under which punishment depends on whether the offender violated the rule of 
reason. 
13 Equivalent objective functions would require maximizing the net benefit from offenses NB(offenses) = (1–
H(zF))E[M–v– zc | M > zF], or the difference between net deterrence benefits and the costs of enforcement H(zF))(v 
– E[M |M < zF]) – (1–H(zF))zc. 
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 This result replicates Becker (1968), and Polinsky and Shavell (1992) with minor 
modifications.  In intuitive terms, if the offender’s activity is potentially efficient, in the sense 
that the gain to at least some offenders exceeds the marginal social cost of the offense, then the 
optimal penalty internalizes the marginal social cost of the offense.  In order to minimize 
enforcement costs the state sets the probability of apprehension at its minimum level.  However, 
if the offender’s activity is not potentially efficient, the optimal policy is to completely deter it by 
eliminating the offender’s gain. 
 It follows that an antitrust punishment authority should distinguish conduct that is 
potentially efficient from conduct that is not, and apply the internalization policy in the 
potentially efficient category and the complete deterrence policy in the inefficient category.  
Suppose the monopolizing firm takes an act that allows it to extract surplus from consumers and 
may also generate an efficiency gain, as shown in Figure 1 – such as an exclusive dealing 
contract that forecloses competition and at the same time reduces supply costs.  Since M = 
T+E,14 and v = T+D, the optimal static penalty is F* = (T+D)/z' + c.  If no efficiency gain were 
possible, the optimal policy would seek to eliminate expected profits.  F* would serve the gain-
elimination purpose, as would any other penalty greater than T/z'. 
 
                                                 
14 Since M is a random variable and T is fixed, E, the efficiency gain, is a random variable.  The efficiency gain 
associated with the offense determines the uncertainty associated with the gross gain from the offense. 
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    Figure 1 
 
 
8
C. Optimal Punishment Policy: Dynamic Setting 
 
 In the previous part we examined the enforcement model in the context of antitrust, 
replicating the static enforcement policy (internalize transfer and deadweight loss, plus 
enforcement cost).  In this part, we extend the model to incorporate investment by the offender. 
 The reason for taking investment by the offender into account is that it is important in 
the antitrust setting, especially in monopolization cases.  Suppose the monopolizing firm has 
undertaken investments that benefit consumers, such as creating a new product market.  The 
static enforcement policy may be socially excessive because it might prevent the firm from 
earning a break-even return on its investments in market creation.  This is distinguishable from 
the static case without investment, where the product market was already in existence and the 
monopolizing firm takes an action that permits it to gain monopoly power, perhaps also with an 
efficiency gain.  In the model below, the firm creates the market and then monopolizes it. 
 
1. Assumptions 
 
 Using Figure 1, the firm invests in the first period creating the market.  In the second 
period, the firm takes an action that monopolizes the market.  As in the previous model, the 
second period action could generate an efficiency gain.  When the monopolizing firm creates the 
market, it generates S = T+D+W.  If the firm is deterred from monopolization, consumers get S.  
If the firm is not deterred from monopolization, consumers get W. 
 For example, suppose in the first period the firm invests in the design and production of 
a new artificial tooth that will be ready to market in the second period.  The tooth design can be 
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copied by rivals easily, so the second period market has the potential to be perfectly competitive.  
However, the firm can reduce competitive pressure, and thereby appropriate part of the 
innovation return, by engaging in an exclusionary act at the start of the second period.15  The 
ideal exclusionary act would be the attainment of a legal barrier to entry, such as a patent, but 
such options may not be available to the firm or may not be effective.16  Suppose the firm’s best 
option for appropriating some of the surplus from innovation is to enter into an exclusive dealing 
contract with a key resource supplier,17 and that in addition to excluding competition the contract 
reduces supply costs (say, by permitting the resource supplier to better predict demand).18  The 
returns from the creation of the new artificial tooth depend on the firm’s later success in 
excluding competition.19  It will have an incentive to monopolize if the gains from 
monopolization exceed expected antitrust penalties. 
                                                 
15 The exclusionary or monopolizing act could take an infinite number of forms, many of them seemingly innocent.  
For example, even the decision to keep rival firms from learning about a new product under development has an 
exclusionary effect, because it allows the innovator to take advantage of lead time.  In Berkey Photo v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), the defendant (Kodak) was sued under the Sherman Act for not pre-
disclosing information on a new type of camera film it had created.  The court held in favor of Kodak on the ground 
that a pre-disclosure duty would weaken incentives to innovate. 
16 If a patent or exclusive license were available (and effective), the analysis here would still apply – the optimal 
penalty should then be understood as the optimal fee for the patent or the license.  Thus, whether or not legal barriers 
can be used, the optimal penalty result still provides a useful instrument for regulating the firm’s conduct.  As for the 
effectiveness of patents, Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) find that patents are “least emphasized” among 
manufacturing firms in comparison to other methods of appropriating the returns from innovation.  The general 
reasons for this could be (a) legal restrictions on availability (novelty, nonobviousness, naturally occurring 
substances, etc.) and (b) difficulty in enforcement.  
17 This hypothetical is based on the facts of U.S. v. Dentsply Intn’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3rd Cir. 2005).  However, 
the exclusive dealing contract in Dentsply was with dealers rather than suppliers.  An example involving an 
exclusivity contract with a supplier was Alcoa’s contract to purchase electricity on the condition that the seller 
refrain from selling electric power to any other producer of aluminum.  U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 
148 F.2d 416, 422 (2d.Cir. 1945). 
18 The tying contract in International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) was explained by Peterman 
(1979) as a device that permitted the company to better predict, and thereby take advantage of economies in, the 
distribution of salt. 
19 Again, this is true whether the firm uses a legal barrier or self help.  We treat the innovation concept as something 
given to the innovator and examine the incentive to carry it out.  This is distinguishable from the innovation race in 
which firms attempt to develop a new technology at the same time, in which case perpetual rivalry might, or might 
not, enhance innovation.  See Loury (1979); Lee and Wilde (1980); Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, and Howitt 
(2005).  One can distinguish the incentive to search for innovations and the incentive to carry a particular innovation 
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 In the remainder we will focus on the optimality condition for the penalty.  Becker’s 
suggestion that the probability of enforcement should be set at its minimum level (under 
reasonable assumptions) has not been disturbed in the subsequent literature (e.g., Polinsky and 
Shavell, 1992),20 so there is no need to reexamine this issue. 
 
2. Optimal Punishment: Offender Investment 
 
 The potential offender will invest if the expected return from monopolization, net of the 
penalty, exceeds his investment cost.  Let the investment cost, ko, be governed by the probability 
distribution  with corresponding density.  The potential offender invests when ok < ok  = (1–
H(zF))[E(M | M > zF) – zF], and the probability of investment is ( ).oΨ k  
 The problem for the social planner is to choose the optimal fine to maximize the net 
social benefit: 
 
            NB = ( )oΨ k {[(1–H(zF))E(M |M>zF) – E( ok | ok < ok )]  
                                                                             + (1–H(zF))(S–v– zc) + H(zF)S}    (2) 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
concept out.  Competition may reduce the incentive to carry out a particular concept and increase the incentive to 
search for an innovation.  
20 If there is a fixed cost in setting the probability of apprehension, the optimal probability may be positive for 
sufficiently small values of the marginal enforcement cost (Polinsky and Shavell, 1992).  Also, if there is a fixed 
upper limit on the fine, the optimal probability of apprehension will not necessarily be the minimum level.  Risk 
aversion and the social interest in raising penalties in order to give prosecutors bargaining leverage are additional 
factors that could be considered (Mullin and Snyder, 2009).  We do not explore these variations on the Becker 
framework here. 
 
 
11
where the first term (bracketed) is the net gain from investment to the would-be monopolist, the 
second term is the net gain to society if investment is followed by monopolization (S – v = S – T 
– D = W), and the third term is the net gain to society if investment is not followed by 
monopolization.  The first order condition with respect to the fine is 
 
  
2( ){ ( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) }
{ ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( )} 0
o o
o o
NB v zc S zF Ψ k h zF k H zF
F
S k H zF H zF Ψ k h zF


      
   
 .    (3) 
 
Thus, the optimal fine satisfies 
 
  
* * * * *
*
* * * * 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( ))
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( ))
o o
o o
k h zF k H zF H zFv S SF c
z z z k h zF k H zF


           
  ,       (4) 
 
where the first two terms are the familiar static penalty (Landes, 1983), which internalizes 
consumer harm and the enforcement cost.  The remaining terms involve penalties or subsidies.  
The firm gets a subsidy of S/z (third term) for the potential surplus it delivers to consumers when 
it creates a new product market.  The surplus is divided by the probability of apprehension 
because the firm gets no subsidy from the state in cases in which it is not apprehended.  The last 
term targets the investment incentive, and it is a combination of subsidy and penalty.  The first 
component of the numerator reflects a penalty to discourage monopolization, the second a 
subsidy to encourage investment. 
 Overall, the subsidy effect dominates in the last two terms of (4).  Simplifying, we have 
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* *
*
* * * * 2
( )(1 ( ))
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( ))
o
o o
k H zFv SF c
z z k h zF k H zF


        
 .     (5) 
 
Substituting terms from Figure 1, the optimal penalty can be expressed as 
 
                  * 1 T D WF c
z z
                ,        (6) 
 
where  is the last bracketed term in (5), and is a discontinuous function of F with the properties 
 > 0;   = 1 for F* ≤ 0; and (F*) > 0 for F* > 0.21  This implies the following policy. 
 Proposition 2: Under the optimal enforcement policy, the penalty is the sum of two 
components: (1) a weighted average of the penalty that internalizes consumer harm, (T+D)/z, 
and the investment subsidy -W/z, and (2) the enforcement cost c, where the probability of 
enforcement z is set at the minimum level. 
 First, unlike the static scenario examined previously, the complete deterrence policy is 
no longer sensible.  When the monopolist’s investment makes the product market available, its 
conduct always provides some benefit to society, and it would therefore be suboptimal to set the 
penalty with the aim of completely eliminating the firm’s gain. 
 Second, since the subsidy weight 0 <  ≤ 1, the optimal penalty is a two-part fine that (a) 
internalizes the cost of enforcement to the offender and (b) regulates the monopolization and 
                                                 
21 The properties of the optimal penalty are examined in the appendix, specifically in the proof of Proposition 2.  
The optimal penalty (F* = v/z – (S/z) + c) is equal to the net marginal social harm from the offender’s conduct, 
which is the difference between the harm to consumers and the marginal innovation benefit.  The innovation benefit 
is itself a function of the size of the penalty. 
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investment decisions with a component that is a convex combination of the static penalty and an 
investment subsidy.  Since the subsidy weight is greater than zero, the optimal penalty is 
unambiguously less than the static penalty that internalizes consumer harm. 
 Third, comparative statics for the optimal penalty differ from the static case.  Consider 
the behavior of the optimal penalty as consumer harm increases.  Unlike the static case, the 
optimal penalty does not go to infinity as the consumer harm goes to infinity (appendix 
Prosposition 2a).  The optimal penalty increases with consumer harm to a limit consistent with 
sustaining investment.  Moreover, a decline in the probability of apprehension does not 
necessarily cause the optimal fine to increase (appendix, Proposition 2b).  The reason is that as 
the probability of apprehension decreases, the optimal subsidy weight could increase, because it 
may be socially preferable to encourage investment more.  It is not necessarily desirable to 
combine an extremely low probability of apprehension with an extremely high fine. 
 The subsidy weight  captures the relative sensitivities of the firm’s innovation-
investment and monopolization decisions with respect to the penalty.   When 
 
                    
* **
* *
( ) ( )( )
1 ( ) ( )
o
o
k H zFh zF
H zF k
  ,        (7) 
the monopolization elasticity (with respect to the penalty) exceeds the investment elasticity, and 
the subsidy weight 1  .  The penalty is relatively large because its shadow price, 
discouragement of innovation, is relatively low.  When the inequality in (7) is reversed or 
replaced with a strict equality the subsidy weight is equal to one, yielding a pure subsidy in place 
of a penalty. 
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 Note that the optimal penalty formula can be expressed as F* = (1-)[(T+D)/z + c] +(-
W/z+c), which is a weighted average of the optimal static penalty (internalizing consumer harm 
and enforcement cost) and the optimal innovation subsidy (internalizing residual consumer 
surplus and administrative cost of award process).  When the marginal social harm, v + zc, 
exceeds the surplus S (or, equivalently, when the expected enforcement cost, zc, exceeds the 
residual surplus W) the optimal penalty is unambiguously positive.  This makes sense because 
the loss from discouraging investment is relatively small under these conditions, though the 
enforcement policy is still lenient relative to the static model even in this worst-case scenario.  
When the surplus is greater than the marginal harm (equivalently, residual surplus exceeds 
expected enforcement cost), the optimal penalty can be positive (a penalty) or negative (a 
subsidy), depending on whether the surplus gained from deterring monopolization is greater than 
the wealth generated from investment (appendix, Proposition 2).  Punishment becomes more 
severe, holding other factors the same, as the residual surplus falls and as the relative sensitivity 
of innovation to the penalty falls. 
 The key policy implication is that it is not necessarily optimal to impose a penalty for 
monopolization that internalizes consumer harm – such a penalty may excessively deter 
innovation.  Indeed, it may be optimal to subsidize rather than punish the monopolizing firm.22  
One function of the fine is to align private and social incentives for innovation.  If the firm 
monopolizes the market in the second period with probability one, the social gain from the firm’s 
first-period investment would be the sum of the residual consumer surplus and the monopoly 
                                                 
22 It follows also that it may not be optimal to punish the firm even when there are no static efficiencies resulting 
from the monopolizing conduct.  The model assumes the existence of static efficiencies.  But the result that it may 
be optimal to reduce the penalty in order to encourage innovation applies just as well to the case where there are no 
static efficiencies.  Thus, even if an exclusivity contract offers no cost advantage whatsoever, and serves the sole 
purpose of excluding competitors, it still may not be optimal to punish the firm for monopolization.   
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transfer.  The private gain, however, would be the monopoly transfer.  Optimal punishment 
policy trades off deterrence of monopolization with equalizing the private and social gains from 
investment, and the latter goal requires a bounty based on the residual surplus. 
 Although we have focused on monopolizing conduct that might violate the antitrust 
laws, the model applies equally to patents (or to any method of rent appropriation).  The penalty 
result here provides the optimal fee that should be charged to a patentee, which could be a fine or 
a prize, depending on the factors shown in (6). 
 
3. General Applications: Products Liability and Efficiency Defenses 
 
 The previous part examined the offender investment model in the antitrust setting, under 
strict liability.  In this part, we consider other applications, and the rule of reason test for liability. 
 Consider product safety regulation.  The firm invests in the first period, creating the 
market.  In the second period, it decides whether to take care to avoid imposing an injury v on 
the consumer.23  It takes care only if the cost of taking care M is less than the expected fine zF.  
The firm’s investment in the first period is a function of anticipated profit in the second, which is 
determined in part by the relationship between M and zF.  The optimal penalty, F* = v/z – (S/z) 
+ c, where  depends on the relative elasticities of precaution and innovation, compromises 
internalization in order to encourage innovation.  This is not a weighted average of consumer 
welfare components, as in the monopolization case examined earlier, because v does not have 
                                                 
23 This discrete choice assumption simplifies matters and is consistent with the products liability case law.  Every 
products liability design-defect case involves an allegation concerning a discrete decision to adopt a precaution, such 
as installing a safety bar on a hazardous machine. 
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any necessary relationship to S.  The optimal product safety penalty is unambiguously less than 
the one that internalizes the consumer injury, and could be a pure subsidy. 
 Suppose, instead of strict liability, the punishment authority operates under a rule of 
reason which imposes punishment only when M < v.24  The rule of reason test permits defendants 
to be exempted from punishment on the basis of efficiency defenses.  This case has not been 
considered in the economic treatments of punishment (Becker, 1968; Polinsky and Shavell, 
1992).25 
 Under the reasonableness rule, the social objective would be to set the fine to maximize 
 
      NB = ( )oΨ k {(1–H(v))E(M|M>v) + [(H(v)–H(zF))E(M|v>M>zF) – E( ok | ok < ok )]  
                                                                                              + (1–H(zF))(S–v– zc) + H(zF)S}     (8) 
 
where ok  = (1–H(v))E(M|M>v) + (H(v)–H(zF))[E(M|v>M>zF) – zF].  This objective function 
incorporates the facts that when M > v, the punishment authority will apprehend but not punish 
the offender; when v > M > zF, the offender will be punished but will not be deterred from the 
offense; and when zF > M, the offender will be deterred from committing the offense.  The 
optimality condition for (8) implies that the optimal fine is smaller (greater) than the static 
                                                 
24 In antitrust, this test is equivalent to a rule of reason test that permits efficiency defenses (M>v is equivalent to the 
case where the efficiency gain exceeds the deadweight loss, E>D).  Under a perfect-information rule-of-reason 
antitrust regime, there would be no need for antitrust enforcement – because all inefficient cases of monopolization 
would be deterred. 
25 In the static scenario, the most interesting feature of the rule of reason is that it enables the enforcement authority 
to avoid any enforcement expenditure at all.  The offenders for whom M>v would not be deterred by the threat of 
punishment (because they are exempted by the test), and those for whom M<v would be deterred.  There would 
never be a need for enforcers to act. 
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penalty (v/z+c) when the surplus is large (small) relative to the marginal social harm.26  The 
reason for enhancing the penalty (beyond the static level) is to discourage some investment, 
given that some offenders will not be punished under the reasonableness rule even though they 
have forced society to bear the costs of apprehending them.  The subsidy provided by the optimal 
penalty is smaller because the reasonableness rule already exempts some potential offenders 
from any punishment.  The static penalty comes closer to being socially optimal when the 
regulator punishes according to the reasonableness standard than when he punishes under the 
strict liability rule. 
 
4. Victim Investment 
 
 Potential victims invest in some activity, at cost kv.  The gross gain from investment to 
the victim, if there is no offense, is B.  However, because of the risk that an offense will destroy 
the value of the investment, the victim’s expected gain is [1-prob(offense)]B.  The victim suffers 
a direct loss v in the event an offense occurs.  We allow v to differ from B because it is possible 
that the offense both destroys the value of the victim’s investment and imposes a different direct 
loss on the victim. 
 Returning to the terms introduced in earlier, the expected private gain from investment is 
H(zF)B.  Suppose kv has probability distribution R, with corresponding density function r, r(kv) > 
                                                 
26 
* *
*
* * 2 * *
( )( ( ) ( ))( (1 ( ))( ))
( )( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )
o
o o
k H v H zF S H v v zczF v zc
k H v H zF k h zF


        . 
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0 for kv > 0 and r(kv) = 0 otherwise.  The potential victim invests whenever kv  < ( ) ,vk H zF B  
so the probability he invests is ( ).vR k  The expected net benefit from investment is therefore 
 
  ( )vR k E( vk – kv | kv< vk ) (9) 
 
The investment benefit from increasing the fine is equal to the product of the marginal reduction 
in the probability of an offense, zh(zF), and the expected gain among the pool of potential 
investors RB.  Increasing the fine, through its deterrent effect, allows more of those who invest to 
realize their returns without seeing them destroyed by the offender.  The expected net benefit 
from investment is maximized when the penalty is set at a level that eliminates the offender’s 
gain, F Mu/z, and minimized when the penalty is set at zero. 
 Of course, a social planner would not set out solely to maximize the expected net benefit 
from investment.  The social objective is to maximize the net benefits from enforcement, which 
is the sum of the net benefit from investment and the net benefit from offenses, given 
enforcement: 
 
 NB = NB(investment)+ NB(offenses)  
                = ( )( ( )) (1 ( ))[ ( ) ( )]v v vR k k E k k k H zF E M M zF v zc         (10) 
 
 Proposition 3: Let NB* represent the value of the net benefit from enforcement under the 
optimal policy, and let NB  represent the value of the net benefit from enforcement when 
 
 
19
offenses are completely deterred.  Let *( )vM v z c R k B    denote the value of Mu such that 
* .NB NB   Then if Mu > M , the optimal punishment policy is to set the penalty and probability 
of apprehension so that
*
* ( )vR k BvF c
z z
    .  If Mu ≤ M , then the optimal policy is to set the 
fine and the probability of apprehension so that zF  Mu. 
 The optimal penalty internalizes the direct loss, the enforcement cost, and the investment 
return forgone due to the fear of offenses.  Here the circumstances under which a complete 
deterrence policy is optimal are broader than in the static case.  If the maximum gain to offenders 
is less than the marginal social cost of an offense, complete deterrence is optimal, as in the static 
case.  However, even if the maximum gain exceeds the marginal social cost of an offense, 
complete deterrence may be optimal, because the gain is insufficient to compensate for the cost 
of reduced investment. 
 The case in which offensive conduct discourages investment by potential victims was 
first considered by Bentham, who referred to the “secondary effects” of criminal behavior 
(Bentham 1789, at 153).  Bentham noted that offensive conduct led to primary and secondary 
harms to society; where primary harms are the direct and derivative losses, as well as 
enforcement costs, and secondary harms are the costs that result from discouraged investment 
and extend “either over the whole community, or over some multitude of unassignable 
individuals” (Bentham, at 153).  Secondary effects could include a range of costs generated by 
changes in behavior resulting from fear of crime.  Bentham argued that punishment should be 
enhanced to internalize secondary costs.  The penalty formula derived here formalizes 
Bentham’s recommendation. 
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D. Headline Effects and Penalties 
 
 News headlines alter the investment decisions of offenders or victims.  The headlines 
may lead the offender to believe that the likelihood of apprehension is greater than it is.  To 
model headline effects, let the perceived probability of apprehension differ from the real 
probability of apprehension: (1 )z z   .  The optimal policy is now 
 
 
* *
*
* * * * 2
( )(1 ( (1 ) ))1 { }
1 ( ) ( (1 ) ) ( )(1 ( (1 ) ))
o
o o
k H z Fv SF c
z z k h z F k H z F
 
   
               
,   (11) 
 
which suggests that the fine should be reduced to compensate for the offender’s overestimate of 
the likelihood of punishment (μ > 0 case). However, because the sign of the portion of the 
penalty regulating the investment decision is ambiguous, offender overestimation of the 
likelihood of apprehension could raise or lower the optimal penalty.  An overestimate of the 
probability of punishment makes the punishment for monopolization seem more likely, but the 
associated change in investment incentives could lead to a reduction the optimal subsidy 
component. 
 Now suppose the victim invests while relying on news headlines to predict the likelihood 
that he will reap the rewards.  The break-even cost level for the victim is (1 ) ( )vk H zF B  , 
where  > 0  means that the victim underestimates the likelihood of an offense that destroys his 
investment.  The optimal penalty satisfies 
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* 2 *
* ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( )v vR k B B r k H zFvF c
z z
      ,    (12) 
   
implying that the penalty should be reduced when the victim underestimates the likelihood of an 
offense, and increased when the victim overestimates the likelihood.  The reason for reducing the 
penalty when the victim underestimates is to align private and social incentives to invest.  If the 
victim thinks that there will not be an offense, he will invest too much in light of the return.  The 
penalty is reduced in order to indirectly diminish the investment incentive.27 
  The parameter  is an index of the alarm-to-danger ratio identified by Bentham 
(1789, at 153).  If  is equal to zero, the danger and alarm caused by offensive activity are the 
same; the impressions potential victims get from reading newspaper headlines are accurate 
indicators of the likelihood of an offense.  If  is positive, the alarm is less than the danger, and 
if  is negative the alarm is greater than the danger.  The optimal penalty, consistent with 
Bentham, implies that the fine should increase as the alarm increases relative to the danger, in 
order to internalize the negative investment effect. 
 
III. Discussion 
A. Antitrust 
 Since the normative implications of this model have been mentioned in the course of its 
presentation, we will focus on positive implications for antitrust law here.  The offender 
                                                 
27 A similar problem is encountered in the context of crime and victim precaution.  The optimal fine varies in order 
to control the incentives of both offender and victim, see Hylton (1996). 
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investment model suggests that the social payoff from innovation antecedent to or associated 
with monopolization should be part of rule of reason analysis under the Sherman Act.  The law 
appears to reflect this recommendation already.  Monopolies are not illegal per se.28  Antitrust 
law immunizes firms from liability when they have acted merely as profit-maximizing 
monopolists (e.g., setting the monopoly price).29  Liability is imposed under Section 2 for 
predatory conduct and efforts to exclude rivals.  Exploitative conduct is distinguished from 
exclusionary conduct. 
 Although antitrust law is underinclusive in comparison to the optimal penalty model 
presented here, the exemption provided to firms that merely exploit their market power rather 
than exclude rivals can be understood as an attempt by the law to accommodate the welfare gains 
from innovation.  One paradox of antitrust, stressed in Judge Hand’s Alcoa opinion, is that cartel 
pricing is per se illegal, while monopoly pricing is per se lawful.30  These basic rules are not 
contradictory under our model. 
 For firms that engage in exclusionary conduct the law is overinclusive, in the sense that 
it does not reduce expected penalties to compensate for the creation or expansion of markets 
through innovation.  One exception is United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp.,31 where the 
court held that rule of reason rather than per se liability applied to tying policies that were 
                                                 
28 The legal standard is described as a balancing test that compares anticompetitive harms with procompetitive 
benefits, see U.S. v. Microsoft,  253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
29 In Alcoa, Judge Learned Hand distinguished monopolies that are passively acquired, and monopolies acquired 
through superior skill, foresight, and industry, from monopolies that are actively acquired.  See Alcoa, 148 F.2d, at 
429-431.  Carlton and Heyer (2008) propose the distinction between extraction and extension as a normative 
guideline for monopolization law.  This model distinguishes innovation (creation) from extraction.  The distinctions 
are not the same.  There are cases that could be described as extension (tying, exclusive dealing) where punishment 
would have to be moderated in light of investment incentive effects under this model. 
30 The paradox served as a key justification for Judge Learned Hand’s reform of monopolization law in Alcoa.  Hand 
argued that monopolies (monopoly pricing) should be viewed in the same way as cartels (cartel pricing).  Alcoa, 148 
F.2d., at 427-29.  For a discussion of innovation and its implications for Hand’s Alcoa argument, see Evans and 
Hylton (2008). 
31 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff’d per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961). 
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instituted at a time when the market for antennae systems was in its infancy.  Jerrold had played 
a central role in the creation of the market.  The court exempted Jerrold from antitrust liability 
for the infancy period of its business, effectively a penalty reduction to compensate for 
innovation.  Our model implies that the doctrine of Jerrold Electronics should be incorporated 
generally into monopolization law.32 
 Of course, a symmetrical and opposing conclusion applies where the dominant firm’s 
conduct discourages innovation by rivals.  The rule of reason should take into account evidence 
that the monopolist’s conduct reduced innovation by potential competitors.33 
 
B. Torts 
 
 Now consider implications for tort law.  The damage multiplier approach (Polinsky and 
Shavell, 1998) suggests that the optimal tort damage award will divide the harm by the 
probability of liability.  However, this is inadequate as a method of internalizing social costs 
when there are negative investment effects from offenses.  Conversely, the multiplier approach 
inefficiently overdeters when the offender’s investment yields a positive externality and is 
dependent on profits from a later action that may cause harm. 
                                                 
32 Baker (2005) argues that enforcement authorities are sensitive to innovation effects in their targeting decisions.  If 
enforcement authorities targeted only those cases in which the monopolization effect is substantially greater than the 
investment effect ( close to zero), then antitrust enforcement would be virtually optimal, as Baker contends.  This 
argument assumes a best-case scenario for enforcement priorities, which seems implausible in view of the fact that 
enforcement priorities vary according to the type of administration in office (anti-business versus pro-business).   
33 The offender-investment and victim-investment models can be combined to yield an optimal penalty formula that 
balances opposing externalities.  In the combined model, the penalty would be reduced relative the benchmark static 
penalty to the extent that punishment reduced the social gain from investment by the offender, and enhanced to the 
extent that punishment of the offender encouraged potential victims to invest.  The net direction would be 
ambiguous a priori, but could be simulated under parameter assumptions.  Segal and Whinston (2007) suggest that a 
policy that protects victims would be preferable because it would frontload profits to new innovators (entrants).  
These considerations complicate the analysis and raise questions about the ability of an enforcement authority to 
implement a policy free from error. 
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 Suppose the firm invests in a new vaccine in the first period.  In the second period, when 
the product is on the market, it can adopt some precaution to reduce the likelihood of harm to 
consumers.  The precaution could take many different forms: enhancing the warning label, or 
better monitoring of the production process.  The firm decides in the second period whether to 
take the precaution by comparing the cost of precaution to the expected fine.  This description of 
the vaccine marketing is analogous to the investment-monopolization model examined earlier.  It 
follows that the optimal penalty will depend on several factors: the harm to the consumer, the 
positive externality to society (consumer surplus from innovation and externalities from 
vaccination), the degree to which an increase in the penalty affects the investment incentive 
versus the precaution incentive. 
 This implies that strict products liability may not be optimal in the innovation setting, or 
in a setting in which the firm’s product yields beneficial externalities (e.g., vaccines).  If the 
injuries caused by the product are not large in relation to the surplus created, the negligence 
standard may be preferable to strict liability.34 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
                                                 
34 In the case of drugs, the law shows some signs of incorporating this implication, though the record is mixed.  
Comment k of Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A, suggests that courts should exempt drug makers from 
strict liability for product defects (and defective designs).  In Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049 (1988), the 
California Supreme Court held that comment k insulated all Food and Drug Administration-approved prescription 
drugs from strict liability for design defect.  The Court reasoned that strict liability would deter innovation of new 
drugs.  The California courts later applied the same reasoning to implanted prescription medical devices; see 
Artiglio v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 4th 1388 (1994); Plenger v. Alza Corp., 11 Cal. App. 4th 349 (1992).  
However, Brown has been adopted in only a minority of U.S. states.  To some extent, courts have moved in the 
direction of a negligence framework by embracing risk-utility analysis. 
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 Using a model of punishment with monetary penalties, we have examined the design of 
optimal penalties in settings where agents make investments.  The key scenario examined is that 
in which the offender invests in an activity that benefits society, and the private return to that 
activity is a function of the offense he later commits, as well as the penalty.  The optimal policy 
strikes a balance between internalizing the costs of the offender’s conduct and subsidizing the 
offender’s investment.  In the monopolization setting, the optimal penalty is a weighted average 
of a penalty that internalizes the consumer harm and a subsidy that internalizes the consumer 
benefit created by investment, with the weights depending on the relative elasticities of 
investment and monopolization with respect to the penalty.  Under certain conditions, the 
subsidy component may dominate the penalty, generating a reward for monopolization.  
Although rewarding a monopolizing firm seems counterintuitive and inconsistent with the static 
enforcement model, the law on monopolization – particularly its puzzling leniency – is best 
explained by a theory that views encouraging innovation as one of the implicit goals of antitrust 
policy.    
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: The social planner’s problem is to choose z and F to minimize 
 
0
( )( ( )) (1 ( ))( )
( ) (1 ( ))( )
zF
C H zF E M M zF H zF v zc
Mh M dM H zF v zc
    
   
 
 
The first-order conditions are: 
 
( )( )C zh zF v zc zF
F
      
 
( )( ) (1 ( ))C Fh zF v zc zF H zF c
z
        
 
Note that when *z and *F are chosen so that * *z F is greater than Mu, then the offender is 
completely deterred and the above equation equals to E(M). We discuss the optimal 
choice of enforcement rate and penalty below. 
 
(1) uv z c M   
 
This is the case where the minimum cost from an offense is higher than the maximum 
benefit to the offender.  In this case it is optimal to eliminate offenses by setting * *z F is 
greater than Mu. Here is the proof.  
 
( )( ( )) (1 ( ))( ) ( )( ( )) (1 ( ))
( )( ( )) (1 ( ))( ( )) ( )
uC H zF E M M zF H zF v zc H zF E M M zF H zF M
H zF E M M zF H zF E M M zF E M
        
     
 
 
In this scenario, E(M) is the lower bound for social cost, as in Figure A1.  Given a 
specific enforcement rate z, * { :   /z}.  uF F F M   
 
(2) uv c M   
Given a specific value of z, let * vF c
z
   and L uMF
z
 . Note here that * LF F .  
When *F F , C is decreasing and when F > F*, C is increasing until it reaches E(M) for 
.LF F    Figure A2 shows the relationship. Thus for a given z, the optimal choice of 
F is F*. 
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Moreover, given F*, C is increasing in z so that it is optimal to set * .z z   Consequently, 
the optimal policy is { *z z , * vF c
z
  } and the corresponding social cost is 
C*= ( )( ( )) (1 ( ))( )H v z c E M M v z c H v z c v z c          . Note that C* is smaller than 
E(M).  
 
(3) uv z c M v c     
 
Using the same logic, we know that given a specific value of z, the optimal F is 
* vF c
z
  . Depending on the value of z, now *F may be smaller or bigger than FL.  As 
for LF F  ,  C remains at the level E(M) so it would be better to have * LF F  so that 
we could reach the cost level less than E(M). Thus in this scenario, the optimal policy is 
again reached when z is set at its minimal level and F equals to F*, namely, { *z z , 
* vF c
z
  }. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1 
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Figure A2 
 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof follows in three steps.  
First, we show that it is never optimal to set * *z F  greater than Mu.  If z*F*  Mu, the 
offender will not make any investment and there will be no social gain. Instead, for any 
* *
uz F M , we observe a positive social benefit as 
* * * * * * *
* * * *
* *
*
* * * * 2
( (1 ( )){(1 ( ) ( ) (1 ( )( ) ( ) }
( ){(1 ( )( ) ( ) }
( ) ( )( ) 0
( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( ))
o o
o
o
o
o
NB Ψ k H zF H zF E M M zF k H zF S v zc H zF S
Ψ k H zF zF S v zc H zF S
Ψ k h zFΨ k SΨ k h zF k H zF
         
     
  
 
Second, we need to prove that the optimal penalty *F is the unique solution to the global 
maximum. The first order condition (equation 3 in the paper) can be simplified as 
follows: 
 
C(F) 
F* FL
F
Mu > v + c 
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2( ){ ( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) } { ( )(1 ( ))}
{ }
o o o
NB v zc zF Ψ k h zF k H zF S k H zF
F
P v Sc F
z z z
 

       
   
.           (2A) 
where 2( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( ))o oP Ψ k h zF k H zF   and ( )(1 ( ))ok H zFP
  . Since 0P  , if 
there exists *F such that  
                                            ( )v SF c F
z z
     ,                                                         (2B) 
then we will have
*
0
F F
NB
F 
  .  
 
To proceed, let’s first take a look at  , which is a function of F . When 0F  , 1  ; 
when 0F  ,   is strictly increasing in F  because  (1) ( )
( )
o
o
Ψ k
k is increasing in ok and ok is 
decreasing in F ; (2) ( )
(1 ( ))
h zF
H zF is decreasing in F ; (3) (1 ( ))H zF is decreasing in F ; 
(4) both ( )
( )
o
o
Ψ k
k and 
( )
(1 ( ))
h zF
H zF are positive.  
 
Let min be the value of   when F is approaching zero. It is straightforward that 
min 0
( )lim 1
( ) ( ) ( )
o
F
o o
k
Ψ k h zF k
     . [The value of min will depend on the shape of 
the distributional forms of ( )  and ( )H  . For example if we assume that both of them 
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take an exponential form with mean of 1/  and 1/ H , then 
min
1 1
2( )( 1) 1
HH e
       .] 
 
Let’s then consider equation (2B). The left-hand side (LHS) of equation (2B) is F itself, 
which could be treated as a strictly increasing function of F. The right-hand side (RHS) 
then is a nonincreasing function where 
 if 0
if 0
v Sc F
z zRHS
v Sc F
z z

       
 
and the RHS reaches its maximum at min
v Sc
z z
  when 0F  . The following three 
cases are explained for the equality of the LHS and RHS.  
 
Case 1: 0v Sc
z z
     
It is obvious that in this case, min 0
v Sc
z z
   . There exists a unique solution such that 
LHS RHS  and the unique equilibrium is * * 0v SF c
z z
    . The proof of the global 
maximum is quite straightforward: when *F F , 
*
0
F F
NB
F 
  ; and when 
*F F , 
*
0
F F
NB
F 
  . This case corresponds to the graph in Figure A3 below. 
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Before moving to Case 2, we will briefly discuss two properties of the Case 1 solution.   
Proposition 2a: As v goes to infinity, the optimal penalty converges to a constant F** that 
satisfies θ(F**) = 1.  
Proof: Recall that the optimal penalty F* satisfies:  
* * *( )( ) (1 ( ))v S w v wRHS c F c F F LHS
z z z z
         
 
First, it is easy to show that F* is increasing in v. To see why, assume that v is increased 
to v' and the associated optimal penalty is F*'.  We need to show that F*' > F*.  Assume 
otherwise that F*' ≤  F*, θ(F*') ≤  θ(F*), so that RHS(F*') > RHS(F*). However LHS(F*') ≤ 
LHS(F*) so that RHS(F*' ) > LHS(F*'), a contradiction.  Second, we need to show that 
when v goes to infinity, F* does not goes to infinity. Otherwise if F* goes to infinity, θ 
)(45 LHS
 ( 0)v Sc θ RHS,F
z z
  
*F
Figure A3: Case 1 
( , 0)
v S
c RHS F
z z
  
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will also go to infinity.  As a result, RHS(F*) goes to negative infinity, which contradicts 
the fact that LHS(F*) goes to positive infinity.  Last, since F* is increasing in v and since 
F* is finite as v goes to infinity, then it must be the case that θ goes to 1 so that the 
optimal penalty makes RHS = LHS.  We have shown that θ is increasing in F, so that the 
optimal penalty is F** which satisfies θ(F**) = 1. 
Proposition 2b: When z is decreasing, F* is ambiguous.  
Proof:  It is easy to show that when z is decreasing, zF* is decreasing as well. To see why, 
since v/z0 + c – (S/z0)θ(z0F0*) = F0*, we have v + z0c − Sθ(z0F0*) = z0F0*.  Now z0 is 
decreased to z1 and v + z1c − Sθ(z1F1*) = z1F1*.  If z1F1* ≥  z0F0*, we know that Sθ(z1F1*) 
≥  Sθ(z0F0*) (as θ is increasing in zF) and so that v + z1c − Sθ(z1F1*) < v + z0c − Sθ(z0F0*).  
However, if z1F1* ≥  z0F0*, v + z1c − Sθ(z1F1*) ≥  v + z0c − Sθ(z0F0*) by the definition of 
the optimum. We see a contradiction here so that z1F1* < z0F0*.  The remaining question 
is whether F* is increasing or decreasing.  Using the implicit function theorem, ∂F*/∂z = 
[c – (1+sθ')F*]/z(1+ sθ'), where 
( )zF
    , and this depends on the comparison of c and 
(1+sθ')F*, which further depends on the function θ, especially the value of θ' at F*. 
 
Case 2: 0v Sc
z z
    and min 0v Scz z     
Again we obtain a unique optimum * 0v SF c
z z
     for LHS = RHS. *F is the global 
maximum as when *F F , 
*
0
F F
NB
F 
  ; and when 
*F F , 
*
0
F F
NB
F 
  . This case 
corresponds to the graph in Figure A2. 
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Case 3: 0v Sc
z z
    and min 0v Scz z     
There exist two *F  (one for * 0F   and the other for * 0F  ) such that LHS RHS : 
*
1 0
v SF c
z z
     and * *2 0v SF cz z     . It can be verified that both are local 
maximums since 
*
1
0
F F
NB
F 
  and *
10
0
F F
NB
F  
  ; and *
20
0
F F
NB
F  
  and 
*
2
0
F F
NB
F 
  .   The solutions are illustrated in Figure A5.  The global maximum is the 
*F that provides the higher social benefit.  
 
 
 
)(45 LHS
 ( 0)v Sc θ RHS,F
z z
  
*F
Figure A4: Case 2 
( , 0)v Sc RHS F
z z
  
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Consider the following comparison of the two F* solutions: 
*
1 0
v SF c
z z
     so that 1 *1ok M zF M S v zc       
1
1 1
1
1 1
0
( ){ ( ) ( )}
( ) ( )o
o o
k
o o
NB Ψ k M E k k k S v zc
Ψ k k k k dk
     
    
* *
2 0
v SF c
z z
     so that 
*
2
2 * * 1
2 2( ) (1 ( ))o ozFk Mh M dM H zF zF k     
)(45 LHS
 0v Sc θ (RHS,F )
z z
  
2
*F
Figure A5: Case 3 
( , 0)v Sc RHS F
z z
  
*
1F
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2
2 * * 2 * *
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 * * 2 * *
2 2 2 2
2 2 * *
20
( ){(1 ( )) ( ) ( ) (1 ( ))( ) ( )
( ){ (1 ( )) ( ) (1 ( ))( ) ( )
( ) ( ) (1 ( ))o
o o
o o o
k
o o
NB Ψ k H zF E M M zF M E k k k H zF S v zc H zF S
Ψ k k H zF zF E k k k H zF S v zc H zF S
Ψ k k k k dk S S H zF 
         
         
    
Note that * must be smaller than one since *1 0v SF cz z     and 
* *
2 0
v SF c
z z
    . Also note that 
0
( ) ( )o
k
o oΨ k k k k dk  is strictly increasing in 
ok and 
2 1
o ok k , we have 
1 2
1 1 2 2
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )o o
k k
o o o oΨ k k k k dk Ψ k k k k dk     . Still, 
2NB could be greater than 1NB  given a large enough S.  The net subsidy solution 
*
1F  is 
preferable to the penalty *2F  if the enhanced wealth from additional investment is greater 
than the wealth gained from deterring monopolization with the penalty. 
 
Lastly, we show that it is optimal to set z z .  The first-order condition with respect to z 
is as follows, 
2( ){ ( ) ( ) ( )(1 ( )) } ( )(1 ( ))
{ ( ) ( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( )}
o o o
o o
NB F v zc S zF Ψ k h zF k H zF k H zF c
z
FS k H zF H zF Ψ k h zF
 

        
  
F
 
Given that *F F , 
*
*( )(1 ( )) 0o
F F
NB k H zF c
z


     so that it is optimal to choose 
the minimum enforcement rate.  
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: The social welfare function can be expressed as 
( )( ( )) (1 ( )){ ( ) ( )}v v vNB R k k E k k k H zF E M M zF v zc         
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where ( )vk H zF B .   
Assume that uzF M .  The two first-order conditions for the welfare maximization 
problem are: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )v
NB R k Bzh zF zh zF zc v zF
F
       
where the first term denotes marginal gain from investment; and  
( )( ( ) ) (1 ( ))v
NB Fh zF zc v zF R k B H zF c
z
       .  
Using the same logic of the basic model (see Proposition 1), it is easy to show that for a 
given value of z, F is optimally set so that 
*
* ( )vR k BvF c
z z
   .  And since NB is 
decreasing in z when 
*
* ( )vR k BvF c
z z
   , it is optimal to choose enforcement rate at its 
minimal level, namely *z z .  
Now let *NB denote the social welfare evaluated at *( , )z F , namely, 
 * * * * * *( )( ( )) (1 ( )){ ( ) ( )}v v vNB R k k E k k k H z F E M M z F v z c           
And let NB be the social welfare evaluated when * { :   /z}.  uF F F M  In this latter 
scenario, the offense is completely deterred and social welfare depends solely on the 
victim’s net gain from investment, where ( )[ ( )]v vNB R B B E k k B   .   
(1) *( )u vM v z c R k B    
In this case, it is optimal to set * *z F  greater than uM  as 
*NB  is smaller than NB .   
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* *
* *
* * * * *
* * * * *
( )( ( )) (1 ( ))( ( )) ( )[ ( )]
( )( ( )) (1 ( )) ( ) ( )[ ( )]
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 0
v v
v v
v v v u v v
v v v v v v
B B
k k
B B
k k
NB NB R k k E k k k H z F M v z c R B B E k k B
R k k E k k k H z F R k B R B B E k k B
kr k dk B r k dk
B r k dk B r k dk
           
       
 
  
 
 
 
(2) *( )u vM v z c R k B    
First, let *NB NB    and it is easy to show that   is increasing in uM  as 
 ( )u u
u
M h M
M
  . 
Let M denote the value of uM such that 
* 0NB NB  .  Based on case (1), it is obvious 
that M  is bigger than *( )vv z c R k B  . For { : }u u uM M M M  , *NB NB  so that 
*{ , }z F is the optimal policy; for *{ : ( ) }u u v uM M v z c R k B M M     , *NB NB so 
that * * uz F M is the optimal policy.  
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